$400,000 Judgment for Seaman’s Pre-Death Fear and Conscious Pain and Suffering Affirmed on Appeal
In McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 2017 WL 1321979 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 2017), Sky Sonnier, a crewman on a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig operating in Louisiana navigable waters, was killed when the rig and truck toppled over, pinning him between the derrick and mud tank. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge’s finding that Sonnier’s survivors were entitled to recover $400,000 in damages for the fear he experienced trying to avoid the impact and the few minutes of conscious pain and suffering he endured before he expired. The appeals court wrote:
“As to pre-death conscious pain and suffering, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Sonnier testified that Sonnier could have been conscious and aware for up to five minutes after impact, but was more likely than not conscious for one to two minutes after impact. Moreover, witness testimony claimed that Sonnier was alive and gurgling blood shortly after impact, and the district court appears to have found this testimony credible.”
The appellate court noted that the Jones Act enables a plaintiff to recover damages for pre-death pain and suffering, and that “[c]ompensable pain and suffering includes a victim’s ’emotional injury caused by fear of physical injury to himself.'” For a plaintiff to recover damages for a decedent’s post-injury pain and suffering, “he ‘must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent was conscious after realizing his danger.'”
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WA State Supreme Court: Jones Act Seaman Can Recover Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness Claim
In Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC, No. 92913-1 (Wa. March 9, 2017) (en banc), the Washington (state) Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, the issue of the recoverability of punitive damages in a Jones Act seaman’s general maritime law unseaworthiness claim is governed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). The Washington Supreme Court, frontally disagreeing with the oft-cited U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in McBride v. Estis Well Service, LLC, 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014), which held the issue of the recoverability of punitive damages in a GML unseaworthiness claim is controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), wrote:
“It followed Miles‘s reasoning, noting that because the Jones Act limits recovery of punitive damages for actions brought under it, the same result must occur when a Jones Act claim and general maritime claim are joined in the same action. McBride, 768 F.3d at 388-89. However, as discussed above, this rationale misinterprets both Miles and its interaction with Townsend. Miles is limited to tort remedies grounded in statute. Unseaworthiness is not such a remedy. Congress has not directly addressed the damages available for an unseaworthiness claim. Because of this, following Townsend, punitive damages for unseaworthiness have not been curtailed. Absent an indication that a general maritime cause of action has been removed from the general maritime rule, common law remedies are still available. Therefore, we apply Townsend‘s rationale and find that punitive damages are available for unseaworthiness claims.”
The facts of the underlying serious injury, as alleged by the plaintiff, Allan Tabingo, as summarized by the Court, are as follows:
“In February 2015, Tabingo was tasked with moving the fish below decks. He was on his knees near the hatch’s hinge, gathering the last remaining fish, when another deckhand started closing the hatch. Realizing how close Tabingo’ s hands were to the hatch, the deckhand attempted to correct his mistake. However, the hatch’s control handle was broken and the deckhand could not stop the hatch. The hydraulic hatch closed on Tabingo’ s hand, resulting in the amputation of two fingers. Tabingo alleges that American Seafoods knew about the broken handle for two years before the incident but had failed to repair it.”
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Court Finds Seaman’s Protection Act Requires Tug Captain Fired for Reporting Safety Violations be Re-Hired
In Harley Marine Services, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor, 2017 WL 370843 (11th Cir. Jan. 26. 2017), the Court ruled the justification Harley Marine gave for firing tug captain Joseph E. Dady was pretextual, that Harley Marine fired Dady for reporting unsafe activities which violated federal law or regulation, and that Harley knew about Dady’s reports when it fired him. The violations Dady reported related to inadequate crewing, inadequate lookouts, sewage runoff, and steering failure.
***OSHA has a webpage devoted to the Seaman’s Protection Act and how to report violations:https://www.whistleblowers.gov.Share on:
Crewman Seriously Injured From Fall on Icy Barge Deck Can Pursue Unseaworthiness Claim
In Seemann v. Coastal Environmental Group, Inc., 2016 WL 7015728 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016), Johnny Seemann, a crewman aboard a self-propelled barge named the “Army I,” claimed he hurt his back and shoulder when he slipped and fell on a patch of ice and/or snow on the deck of the barge. Among other claims, Seemann alleged the company which owned the barge but had chartered it out was nevertheless liable for the conditions aboard the barge which caused his injuries. Seemann claimed the deck was not properly de-iced, lacked a non-skid surface, and his requests for salt or de-icing materials had gone unfulfilled.
An icy barge deck like this can be an “unseaworthy” condition under the general maritime law, entitling a crewmember to recover significant money damages for his or her injuries.
The Court denied the barge owner’s motion to dismiss Seemann’s unseaworthiness claim, writing:
“The Second Circuit [Court of Appeals] has held that the presence of ice on a ship’s deck may present a condition of unseaworthiness. In Oxley v. City of N.Y., 923 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991), the court held that a district court’s granting of summary judgment for a defendant owner was improper where a third party had slipped on ice that had accumulated on the deck and fell on the plaintiff, causing injuries to the plaintiff. Id. at 24–26. The court stated: ‘It seems to us that [the plaintiff’s] claim of unseaworthiness also must be resolved by a jury. To prevail on this claim, [the plaintiff] need only prove that the [vessel] was insufficiently or defectively equipped, and that his injuries resulted from the unseaworthy condition of the vessel.’ Id. at 26 (citing Waldron v. Moore–McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 726, 87 S.Ct. 1410, 1412, 18 L.Ed.2d 482 (1967); Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595, 596 (2d Cir. 1955)), The Oxley court specifically referred to evidence in the record that showed that the vessel was not adequately furnished with sand and that the deck heating system was inadequate. Id.”
The Court cited other decisions holding that ice or a slippery substance on deck may render a vessel unseaworthy, including conditions such as wet and melted sugar; steps which are painted and maintained so as to be excessively slippery, especially when wet; where design of the vessel may have contributed to the accumulation of ice on deck; and degreaser solvent which is left on deck and the area not cordoned-off nor warning signs posted.
The Court noted the law in this realm is essentially this: “a seaman is not absolutely entitled to a deck that is not slippery. He is absolutely entitled to a deck that is not unreasonably slippery.”
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Court Orders Towboat Company to Produce Surveillance Video Before Crewman’s Deposition
In Meyer v. Turn Services, L.L.C., 2016 WL 6610931 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2016), a federal magistrate judge granted the plaintiff towboat crewman’s motion to compel the defendant towboat company to produce surveillance video it had shot of the crewman. The Court also denied the company’s motion for a protective order to allow it to withhold the video until after its lawyer had taken the crewman’s deposition. Magistrate Judge Wilkinson wrote:
“Defendant has failed to make a particular and specific demonstration of fact, that withholding [its] surveillance evidence will either encourage a dishonest plaintiff to testify honestly or enable them to catch plaintiff in a lie….To conclude that a witness would lie or would testify truthfully only because of the threat that a surveillance tape might exist is simply stereotyping, an exercise in speculation….[Defendant’s argument is] a faulty one, because it flies directly in the face of the very purpose of discovery. The federal rules promote broad discovery so that all relevant evidence is disclosed as early as possible,…a fair contest, where each party can knowledgeably evaluate the strength of its evidence and chances of ultimate success.”
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“To permit plaintiff’s deposition to go forward before production of the surveillance evidence that all parties know exists undermines the search for truth, inhibits full trial preparation and settlement evaluation and invites an evidentiary mess at trial. I have reviewed numerous surveillance films and photographs in personal injury cases during my 21 years as a magistrate judge, both during and before trial. They depict what they depict, but seldom provide a full evidentiary picture. Invariably, the secretly recorded plaintiff has some explanation for the conduct being photographed, some testimony about the absolute necessity of his or her engaging in the photographed activity or some complaint that the photography does not also show the pain, discomfort, disability or medical treatment experienced in the aftermath of the surreptitiously recorded activity. The very purpose of discovery is to get all such facts and explanations on the table and out in the open, so that the case may be fully and accurately evaluated and adjudicated.”
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